Sinn Fein’s big win in North strengthens its hand in the South
Posted By: March 04, 2017
Patrick Murphy. Irish News. Belfast. Saturday, March 4, 2017
The big winner in this election was Sinn Féin. By easily maintaining its position as the largest nationalist party, it retains its veto over Stormont’s future, and while the party may not use its mandate to immediately return to office in Belfast, its election performance has significantly increased its chances of entering the next coalition government in Dublin.
In a policy reversal of equal significance to the IRA ceasefire, SF’s likely seat tally clearly shows that it has convinced its core support to “rise against Stormont” – the very government which, for ten years, it defended against all criticism.
In what opponents would regard as political opportunism and supporters would see as a tactical master-stroke, Sinn Féin’s stance is now in harmony with the growing public perception of Stormont as having failed to deliver.
So we have just witnessed a phony election. That is not to suggest that the result is somehow invalid, but whereas most elections are designed to allow parties to enter government, this one was triggered to get SF out of government in The North (for a while) and into government in The South.
Martin McGuinness apparently saw good behavior in Stormont as the door to the Dublin cabinet office. Gerry Adams will now argue, instead, that opposing a dysfunctional Stormont better qualifies it for Dublin cabinet seats.
Stormont’s failings have given Adams the stronger argument, a point reinforced by Mary Lou McDonald recently, when she announced that Southern Sinn Féin is now willing to become a junior coalition partner. However, to win office in Dublin, SF cannot afford to be in an unpopular and ineffective government in Belfast.
By remaining outside Stormont between now and the Dáil election, Sinn Féin will face no allegations of scandal, no responsibility for failing public services and no forced chuckling with the DUP as Brexit re-builds The Border.
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have been deprived of potential anti-SF election material, as Sinn Féin hugs the media spotlight for as long as it wants the Northern talks to last.
By abandoning its defense of the establishment and resorting to the politics of protest (largely against the culture of government which it helped to create), SF has accurately read the public mood, as its increased electoral support shows.
Ten months ago, Sinn Féin’s manifesto was remarkably similar to the DUP’s. This election’s increased turnout from 54 to 64 percent reflects the injection of a strong dose of sectarianism into the SF-DUP relationship. (Sectarianism is always a good cure for electoral apathy.)
Sinn Féin’s declining electoral support was halted when the party identified the DUP not as a friend, but as an enemy. By portraying the Stormont establishment as Orange, bigoted and inefficient (and the DUP did little to disprove the allegations), SF presented itself as being not just against the establishment, but against the Unionist establishment. It is hard for a nationalist party to do badly in those circumstances – unless you are the SDLP.
By becoming Stormont’s pop-up opposition, Sinn Féin effectively undermined the SDLP’s role in opposing the Stormont executive, correctly claiming that it was SF and not the SDLP which collapsed the assembly. That left the SDLP trying to play catch-up, even though it was opposing the DUP’s policies and practices while SF was still defending them.
It was a move which also left the DUP as the only government party fighting the election. Given Stormont’s unpopularity, an increasingly tired and politically isolated Arlene Foster sought refuge in the Paisleyism from which she had previously tried to distance her party and which now threatens to devour her.
Her decision strengthened SF’s hand and left the UUP sidelined in a sectarian row. Like the SDLP, the UUP faced a difficult election in an increasingly sectarian atmosphere.
However, unlike previous Assembly elections, Sinn Féin has not won office. It has won time to decide what to do next. It is still unclear about its future strategy, but its Northern approach will be determined by Southern politics, particularly in the context of its anti-Brexit stance.
However, only Gerry Adams can straddle the border on the party’s North-South interplay. Should he retire, two separate Sinn Féins will face a more uncertain future, North, and South. He is unlikely to go away, you know.
Of course, all of this leaves the people of The North still struggling with Stormont’s legacy of failure. Some might even suggest that by engineering its electoral fortunes in The South, SF has put political profit before people in The North.
But then elections here tend to be for parties rather than people. This election proved no different.
The big winner in this election was Sinn Féin. By easily maintaining its position as the largest nationalist party, it retains its veto over Stormont’s future, and while the party may not use its mandate to immediately return to office in Belfast, its election performance has significantly increased its chances of entering the next coalition government in Dublin.
In a policy reversal of equal significance to the IRA ceasefire, SF’s likely seat tally clearly shows that it has convinced its core support to “rise against Stormont” – the very government which, for ten years, it defended against all criticism.
In what opponents would regard as political opportunism and supporters would see as a tactical master-stroke, Sinn Féin’s stance is now in harmony with the growing public perception of Stormont as having failed to deliver.
So we have just witnessed a phony election. That is not to suggest that the result is somehow invalid, but whereas most elections are designed to allow parties to enter government, this one was triggered to get SF out of government in The North (for a while) and into government in The South.
Martin McGuinness apparently saw good behavior in Stormont as the door to the Dublin cabinet office. Gerry Adams will now argue, instead, that opposing a dysfunctional Stormont better qualifies it for Dublin cabinet seats.
Stormont’s failings have given Adams the stronger argument, a point reinforced by Mary Lou McDonald recently, when she announced that Southern Sinn Féin is now willing to become a junior coalition partner. However, to win office in Dublin, SF cannot afford to be in an unpopular and ineffective government in Belfast.
By remaining outside Stormont between now and the Dáil election, Sinn Féin will face no allegations of scandal, no responsibility for failing public services and no forced chuckling with the DUP as Brexit re-builds The Border.
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have been deprived of potential anti-SF election material, as Sinn Féin hugs the media spotlight for as long as it wants the Northern talks to last.
By abandoning its defense of the establishment and resorting to the politics of protest (largely against the culture of government which it helped to create), SF has accurately read the public mood, as its increased electoral support shows.
Ten months ago, Sinn Féin’s manifesto was remarkably similar to the DUP’s. This election’s increased turnout from 54 to 64 percent reflects the injection of a strong dose of sectarianism into the SF-DUP relationship. (Sectarianism is always a good cure for electoral apathy.)
Sinn Féin’s declining electoral support was halted when the party identified the DUP not as a friend, but as an enemy. By portraying the Stormont establishment as Orange, bigoted and inefficient (and the DUP did little to disprove the allegations), SF presented itself as being not just against the establishment, but against the Unionist establishment. It is hard for a nationalist party to do badly in those circumstances – unless you are the SDLP.
By becoming Stormont’s pop-up opposition, Sinn Féin effectively undermined the SDLP’s role in opposing the Stormont executive, correctly claiming that it was SF and not the SDLP which collapsed the assembly. That left the SDLP trying to play catch-up, even though it was opposing the DUP’s policies and practices while SF was still defending them.
It was a move which also left the DUP as the only government party fighting the election. Given Stormont’s unpopularity, an increasingly tired and politically isolated Arlene Foster sought refuge in the Paisleyism from which she had previously tried to distance her party and which now threatens to devour her.
Her decision strengthened SF’s hand and left the UUP sidelined in a sectarian row. Like the SDLP, the UUP faced a difficult election in an increasingly sectarian atmosphere.
However, unlike previous Assembly elections, Sinn Féin has not won office. It has won time to decide what to do next. It is still unclear about its future strategy, but its Northern approach will be determined by Southern politics, particularly in the context of its anti-Brexit stance.
However, only Gerry Adams can straddle the border on the party’s North-South interplay. Should he retire, two separate Sinn Féins will face a more uncertain future, North, and South. He is unlikely to go away, you know.
Of course, all of this leaves the people of The North still struggling with Stormont’s legacy of failure. Some might even suggest that by engineering its electoral fortunes in The South, SF has put political profit before people in The North.
But then elections here tend to be for parties rather than people. This election proved no different.
